Chris Gibson: Wages of Insomnia

The Wages of Insomnia | Chris Gibson

A profligate metaphysic, I could, in my mind, lay out grammar as a visible field of rules which operate logically and without axiomisation. Seeing this I could say, Here's the correct use of 'the definite article'. Or 'here' I have proper descriptive sense of the subject-object relationship.

Now I can create examples of just these basic uses and give them, through liberal magnitude, a sense of life as vehicles of another relationship. They become elements of an operation which holds my self-trust to be valid as I've enlivened my perception of the defined articles of use to arise anew even as they operate within the confines which I now see as stricture. And they are extended through a territory they become the conveyors of.

Say this imposed occupancy makes them the illuminators of how the natural numbers are established one from the other. They carry a force of ability derived through their premise as real in another operation. And now they work like tendrils to encompass, accommodate, and establish themselves as describers of Euclidean Geometry. They become testimony. Now here they are the form and body in consequence of use, and through swelling to a great voice of logical justice in another application, sense is separated from mis-sense through the method's sheer imposed presence, and the distance between the two states-of-affairs is impactfully clear as it is comprehended.

Like Wolff's “Orlando,” the application evolves to convey itself as meaning. The act, the thing-in-itself, is description. It is participating in description. Life a-priori as method. Looking at the state-of-affairs of description is looking at a seemingly complex array of pseudo-similar topics. These topics are separated by dissemilarity yet are subject to an assessment of each which in its method holds them in parallel and addresses one as ALL in result. The method is the system which binds and coerces observers into the experience of seeing a single manifest representing an array of associated subjects. Yet as subjects they are listed in accordance with mutual features, associates of form. This is the feature, the salient feature, of a method of perceiving function descriptions. There is a calculus being effected which brings to its native end that which is similar to it. It is a perception-esque cognition of a description being a event outside its place.

To dissect grammar as an applied field of rules and extend from it a useable sense that it as tool has many similarities which visibly relate it to logic is to imply that non-essential abstraction has its origin in language. The possibility of non-essential abstraction is the possibility of metaphysic. Language is its own conduit, and logicising into a general area the nature of grammatical use is a parley between two insolvent participants of a non-essential game. To apply a definition of abstract use to a system which is associated only through presumption of method is a metaphysical declaration of self and as such is an acceptable illustration of certain of Wittgenstein's references to the moment of suddenly grasping the use of a word, i.e. its meaning. This typifies the conflation of a logico-presumption. The identifiability common to abstract use is a redundant, omniscient posing of an autocratic state of self. In Freud's work it is the Ego superimposed as a controlling nimbus in an act of extreme objectification of a similar. In that case another being is posed by the ego in a state of vulnerability. The subject is relative because of its distance from the active value system of the objectifying ego of the observer who has assumed the right of complete environmental control. The pseudo-logisist contrives meaning through applying a state of self-subscription to the ordinary workings of something literal, and pseudo logisisation conveys the sense of infinite opportunities of self declaration.